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Tenancy and Soil Conservation in Market Equilibrium 
The question of whether tenancy influences soil conservation decisions is, as Soule, 
Tegene, and Wiebe have noted, one of the classic questions of economics.  It is well 
established in the theoretical literature that farmland owners tend to have strong 
incentives to conserve soil as a means of protecting the value of their land over the long 
run.  It is equally well established that renters tend to have insufficiently strong incentives 
for conserving soil adequately.  Renters have use of a plot of land only temporarily, and 
thus concern themselves with investment in maintaining productivity only over the 
expected life of the rental contract (including anticipated renewals).  Moreover, since 
more erosive farming methods are frequently more profitable in the short run, renters 
typically have incentives to disinvest in soil, that is, mine soils excessively (see for 
example McConnell). 
The empirical literature on adoption of soil conservation measures has produced 
ambiguous results regarding the influence of tenancy.  Some studies have found weak 
evidence indicating less soil conservation on rental land.  Norris and Batie found a weak 
negative correlation between rented land’s share of total acreage operated and Virginia 
farmers’ conservation expenditures.  Lynne, Shonkwiler, and Rola found that Florida 
owner/renters used a larger number of conservation practices than either pure renters or pure 
owner-operators.  Featherstone and Goodwin found a negative correlation between the 
proportion of cropland rented and Kansas farmers’ conservation expenditures.  In contrast, 
neither Norris and Batie nor Rahm and Huffman found a significant correlation between 
tenancy and the adoption of conservation tillage while Lee and Stewart found that owner-
operators were less likely than renters to adopt conservation tillage.   3
One possible explanation of these contradictory results is that these studies fail to 
distinguish between types of rental contracts.  Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe have argued that 
tenants renting land under share contracts have different incentives than those paying cash 
rent.  They show that share renters, like owner-operators, are more likely to find it profitable 
to adopt conservation measures with short term payoffs (e.g., conservation tillage) than cash 
renters.  Conservation measures with medium term payoffs are unambiguously less 
profitable for cash renters than owner-operators, but the same cannot necessarily be said for 
share renters.  Using data from U.S. corn producers, they find that cash renters are less likely 
to use conservation tillage and medium term conservation measures than owner operators.  
Share renters are as likely to use conservation tillage as owner operators but less likely to 
use medium term conservation measures. 
Most of these discussions of the relationship between tenancy and soil 
conservation are partial in nature, considering the problem only from the perspective of 
one of the agents involved (usually the tenant).  In actuality, both agents interact in 
determining stipulations of rental agreements.  Thus, if landowners could monitor 
renters’ farming methods costlessly, they could write and enforce rental contracts that 
would require renters to conserve soil optimally.  If monitoring and enforcement are 
excessively costly, as seems likely (monitoring renters’ farming methods could virtually 
require continuous presence on the farm, while enforcing such contract terms would 
likely require expensive legal action), it might be still possible to write rental contracts in 
ways that mitigate incentives for overexploitation of soils.  For example, Allen and Lueck 
have shown that, in some circumstances, share rental agreements may mitigate tenants’ 
incentives to overexploit soils by reducing the value of the marginal product of soil (in   4
the form of erosion or degradation of soil quality).  Empirically, they find that share 
contracts are more likely in the Northern Plains in situations in which tenants have 
greater ability to exploit soil. 
Landowners have another way to enforce adequate levels of soil conservation: 
They can invest in soil conservation structures, thereby limiting physically the extent to 
which renters overexploit soil.  Lewis and Sappington have shown that such investments 
may be desirable in order to create countervailing incentives in cases of hidden 
information.  This paper examines such a possibility in cases where renters’ soil 
exploitation is non-contractible.  We begin by developing a theoretical model of contract 
structure and levels of investment in such structures in rental land market equilibrium 
when renters’ soil exploitation non-contractible because they are either unobservable or 
unverifiable.  Assuming that both landlords and renters are risk neutral, we show that 
landlords will invest more than the first best level in conservation structures on rented 
land.  Empirically, we use farm-level data on Maryland farmers’ use of erosion control 
structures and other easily observable best management practices that reduce erosion 
(e.g., contour farming).  Linear and Poisson regressions indicate that farmers who rent a 
larger share of the land they operate use a larger number of such structures and practices 
than farmers with the same total land operated, topography, and cropping patterns.  Thus, 
the empirical results are consistent with landlords’ investing in soil conservation 
structures on rental land as a means of counteracting renters’ overexploitation of soil. 
Theoretical Model 
A landlord owns a piece of land that she offers for rent in a competitive market for rental 
land.  Like Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe or Lichtenberg, we use a two-period version of   5
McConnell’s optimal soil conservation model.  Let T denote the multi-product 
technology set of feasible input-output combinations on that piece of land.  We represent 
the technology using a revenue function R(p,w,s,x0,I) = max y,z {p•y-w•z: (x,y,s,x0,I) ˛ 
T} that gives the revenue generated from the profit maximizing choice of crop output 
levels y and other input levels z as a function of soil loss s, a vector of other inputs z, the 
initial soil stock x0, the amount invested in soil conservation structures I, and the vectors 
of input and output prices w and p, respectively.  We assume that production (and thus 
the revenue function) is increasing in s and x0, decreasing in I, and concave in all 
arguments.  Assume also that soil conservation investments impair the marginal 
productivity of soil loss s (RsI < 0). 
The value of the piece of land at the end of the lease period is V(x1), an 
increasing, concave function of the soil stock at the end of the lease period x1.  The state 
transition equation is 
x1 = x0 – h(s,I). 
Assume that the reduction in soil stock h(.) is increasing in s, decreasing in I, and convex 
in all arguments.  Assume also that hsI < 0, soil conservation investment lowers the 
marginal reduction in soil stock due to soil loss.  Let b denote the landlord’s real discount 
factor and c the unit cost of increasing soil loss s. 
Finally, assume that both tenants and landlords are risk neutral. 
First Best  Soil Conservation Investment 
The first best combination of soil loss s and soil conservation investment I maximizes the 
expected present value of the current return from renting the land plus the value of land at 
the end of the lease period (normalized to one year for simplicity):   6
)) , ( ( ) , , , , ( max 0 0 , I s h x v I cs I x s w p R I - + - - b s . 
The necessary conditions for a maximum are: 
(1)        0 = ¢ - - s s h V c R b  
(2)        0 1 = ¢ - - I I h V R b . 
The first best choices of soil loss (s*) and soil conservation investment (I*) equate the 
values of their respective marginal products with the sum of their unit prices and a user 
cost equal to the present value of the changes in the value of the land they induce 
(McConnell, Lichtenberg). 
Soil Conservation Investment in a Cash Rental Contract 
A renter appropriates none of the value of the land at the end of the lease period, i.e., to a 
renter V(x1) = V¢(x1) = 0 always.  Examination of the necessary conditions for a 
maximum under this latter restriction gives the usual results for a renter.  Condition (1) 
indicates that optimal soil loss is greater for a renter than a landlord, since the marginal 
cost of soil loss to the renter (c) is less than the marginal cost of soil loss to the landlord 
(c+bV¢hs).  Condition (2) indicates that the renter will never undertake any conservation 
investment of her own volition: When bV¢hI = 0 (as it does for a renter), the left hand side 
of condition (2) is always negative, implying that a corner solution I = 0 is optimal. 
In principle, the landlord could achieve the first best by including in the rental 
contract a stipulation that the renter restrict soil loss to the first best level s* and by either 
making the first best soil conservation investment I* or stipulating that the tenant do so.  
In practice, soil loss is likely to be non-contractible.  The renter can make adjustments in 
day-to-day farming practices that can influence soil loss substantially.  Monitoring those 
adjustments is likely to be prohibitively costly.  Moreover, problems of verification   7
would arise even if monitoring were economically feasible.  Assume, then, that the 
renter’s soil loss decisions are non-contractible.  (An equivalent assumption is that both 
current production and land value at the end of the lease period are subject to additive 
white noise that render the renter’s choice of soil loss unobservable, e.g., revenue is 
R(p,w,s,x0,I)+e and land value is bV(x1)+h, where e and h both have zero mean.)  As a 
alternative to contracting on soil loss directly, the landlord can make a soil conservation 
investment I and then offer to rent the land for a fixed rental payment t.  (Equivalently, 
the landlord can offer a rental contract stipulating the level of investment I.)  Potential 
tenants bid for the rental contract.  If the rental market is competitive, the winning bidder 
is the one expecting to generate the greatest profit during the lease period.  Once the 
rental contract is signed, the tenant chooses soil loss s maximize her return.  Both tenants 
and landlords are assumed to be risk neutral. 
The landlord’s objective is to choose the level of soil conservation investment I, 
and the fixed rental payment t to maximize the expected present value of the current 
return from renting the land plus the value of land at the end of the lease period 
(normalized to one year for simplicity): 
)) , ( ( max 0 , I s h x V I t I t - + - b  
subject to the renter’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints 
(3)        0 ) , , , , ( 0 ‡ - - t cs I x s w p R  
(4)        } ) , , , , ( max{ arg 0 t cs I x s w p R s - - = . 
The renter’s participation constraint reflects the assumption of competition in the 
market for rental land, which implies that the winning bidder will be the one who can 
generate the greatest current profit during the lease period.  The renter’s participation   8
constraint will always bind, so that the fixed rental payment t will equal the full rent 
generated by the land, 
(5)        cs I x s w p R t - = ) , , , , ( 0 . 
The tenant’s incentive compatibility constraints imply that the choice of soil loss s 
satisfies the first order condition 
(6)          0 = -c Rs . 
The tenant’s optimal choices of s is an implicit functions s(I) of the landlord’s soil 
conservation investment choice.  Differentiating with respect to the level of soil 
conservation investment I gives: 










under our assumptions. 
Substituting, the landlord’s objective function can thus be rewritten: 
)) ), ( ( ( ) ( ) , ), ( , , ( max 0 0 I I s h x V I cs I I x I s w p R I - + - - b , 
which has the first order condition: 
(7)        0 1 =
¶
¶ ¢ - ¢ - -
I
s
h V h V R s I I b b . 
Soil loss and soil conservation investment in rental land market equilibrium, s
o and I
o, are 
defined by equations (6) and (7). 
Soil Conservation Investment and Soil Loss in Rental Market Equilibrium 
Figure 1 compares the first best levels of soil loss s* and soil conservation investment I* 
with soil loss and soil conservation investment in rental land market equilibrium, s
o and 
I
o.  The concavity of the objective functions in (I,s) in both cases means that all four first 
order conditions are downward sloping in (I,s) space.  Stability of equilibrium requires   9
that the slope of the first order condition for I be greater in absolute value (i.e., steeper) 
than that of the first order condition for s in both cases.  Comparing equations (1) and (6) 
indicates that the first order condition for s in the rental land market equilibrium lies 
above and to the right of the first order condition for s in the first best.  Alternatively, 
evaluate equation (6) at the first best levels of soil loss s* and soil conservation 
investment I*: The left hand side is negative, indicating that equation (6) lies above 
equation (1) in (I,s) space.  Similarly, comparing equations (2) and (7) indicates that the 
first order condition for I in the rental land market equilibrium also lies above and to the 
right of the first order condition for I in the first best case. 
As Figure 1 indicates, the rental land market equilibrium features soil loss greater 
than the first best (s
o > s*), soil conservation investment greater than the first best (I
o > 
I*), or both (s
o > s*, I
o > I*).  If the vertical distance between equations (6) and (1) is 
greater than the vertical distance between equations (7) and (2), soil conservation 
investment in rental land market equilibrium will be greater than soil conservation 
investment in the first best (I
o > I*); soil loss s
o in this case may be greater or less than 
the first best level s*. 
Further insight can be gained by considering a first order approximation of 
equations (1) and (2) defining the first best levels of soil loss and soil conservation 
investment (s*,I*) around the rental land market equilibrium levels (s
o,I
o) which can be 
solved for the differences in soil loss (s*-s
o) and soil conservation investment (I*-I
o): 
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I s sI sI h h V h V R B ¢ ¢ + ¢ - = b b . 
2
I II II h V h V R C ¢ ¢ + ¢ - = b b  
Our assumptions imply A £ 0, C £ 0, and AC-B
2 ‡ 0.  The sign of B is ambiguous.  The 
first term, which represents the impact of soil conservation investment on the marginal 
productivity of soil loss in current production, is negative.  The second and third terms, 
which represent the impact of soil conservation investment on the value of the land at the 
end of the current lease, are both positive.  If the land value effects of soil conservation 
investment (the second and third terms in B) outweigh the current productivity effects 
(the first term in B), then B is positive.  In this case, I*-I
o < 0 and s*-s
o > 0, i.e., soil 
conservation investment in rental land market equilibrium is greater than the first best 
level while soil loss is lower than the first best level.  In other words, when soil 
conservation investment has larger effects on land price than on current land productivity, 
landlords will tend to overinvest in soil conservation to such an extent that soil loss will 
be lower than the first best. 
More generally, equation (9) indicates that rental land market equilibrium soil 
conservation investment I
o will exceed the first best level I* whenever B+A[¶s
o/¶I
o] > 0.  
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which is unambiguously positive under our assumptions.  Thus, rental land market 
equilibrium soil conservation investment I
o will always exceed the first best level I*. 
Empirical Application: Maryland Farmers’ Use of Soil Conservation Practices 
The empirical application uses data from a 1998 telephone survey of 487 Maryland 
farmers.  The sample for the telephone survey was drawn from the Maryland Agricultural 
Statistics Service (MASS) master list.  Because of the large percentage of small, non-
commercial farms in Maryland, the sample was stratified, with large operations 
oversampled and small ones undersampled.  The survey was administered by MASS, 
which also provided weights based on annual sales to correct for the stratification. 
The survey contained information on farm operation, farm finance, farm 
topography, human capital of the farm operator, and use of 25 different soil and water 
conservation practices.  Farm operation information included total land operated, owned, 
rented in, rented out; acreage of corn, soybean, small grains, hay, pasture, tobacco, 
vegetables, and other crops; and livestock numbers (milk cows, other cattle, hogs, sheep, 
poultry, horses, and other livestock).  Farm financial information included annual sales 
(recorded as a categorical variable), the percentages of sales derived from crops and 
livestock, and the percentage of income derived from farming.  Topographical 
information included the percentages of land operated with slopes of 2-8 percent and with 
slopes greater than 8 percent.  Human capital indicators included age, education, and 
years spent managing a farm. 
  Farmers were asked whether they used each of 25 different types of conservation 
technologies: critical area seeding, filter strips, riparian buffers, contour farming, 
stripcropping, cover crops, minimum or no tillage, grade stabilization, grass- or rock-  12
lined waterways, terraces, diversions, ponds, sediment troughs, manure storage 
structures/lagoons, permanent vegetative cover, wildlife habitat, stream fencing/stream 
crossings/watering troughs, pre-plant soil testing, pre-sidedress nitrogen testing, manure 
crediting, split fertilizer application, manure incorporation, fertilizer incorporation, 
manure composting, and dead bird composting.  Thirteen of these practices qualify as 
long term investments in erosion or sediment control of the kinds that landlords can make 
themselves or write into enforceable rental contracts.  Some are structures that are costly 
to remove (grade stabilization, grass- or rock-lined waterways, terraces, diversions, 
ponds, sediment troughs).  Others are sufficiently easy to monitor that they can be 
considered contractible (critical area seeding, filter strips, riparian buffers, contour 
farming, stripcropping, permanent vegetative cover, wildlife habitat). 
We use these data to explore the relationship between land rental and investment 
in contractible soil conservation measures.  We cannot test the hypothesis that landlords 
overinvest in these measures because we lack sufficient information about topography, 
soil quality, and other relevant characteristics for every field operated by each farmer that 
would allow us to infer the first best level of investment.  Instead, we investigate the 
hypothesis that the non-contractibility of renters’ soil exploitation enhances landlords’ 
propensity to invest in contractible soil conservation measures. 
We measure soil conservation investment on each farmer’s operation as the total 
number of these contractible practices used.  The mean is about 2 (Table 1).  About 40 
percent use none of these practices while over 30 percent use more than two. 
Like most previous studies, we use the rented proportion of total land operated to 
measure the influence of renting on soil conservation investment.  Our theoretical model   13
suggests that in rental market equilibrium landlords will invest more in contractible soil 
conservation measures than owner-operators.  We thus expect to observe a positive 
correlation between the share of land rented and the number of conservation measures 
used. 
We include total land operated in our models to control for the effect of size.  
Farmland in Maryland exhibits a relatively high degree of heterogeneity in terms of 
topography, soils, and other indicators of erosion potential.  All else equal, a farmer 
operating more acreage is likely to encounter greater variability in land quality, making it 
more likely that a larger number of different kinds of soil conservation measures will be 
profitable.  Also, a study of Maryland farmers by Lichtenberg and Strand using an earlier 
survey found that a number of the soil conservation measures included in our analysis are 
complements.  All else equal, a farmer operating more acreage is more likely to 
encounter conditions under which use of a package of measures is the most profitable.  
For both these reasons we hypothesize a positive relationship between total land operated 
and the number of conservation practices used. 
We control for characteristics of the land operated by each farmer by including 
variables measuring topography and crops grown.  Topography is measured by two 
variables: the percentage of land with moderate (2 to 8 percent) slope and the percentage 
of land with steep (greater than 8 percent) slope.  Since greater slope is associated with 
greater potential erosion, we expect a positive relationship between these variables and 
the number of conservation measures used.  We include acres of five major crops (corn, 
soybeans, small grains, vegetables, tobacco) to control for soil productivity and, to some 
extent, erosion potential.  The row crops corn, soybeans, vegetables, and tobacco are   14
associated with greater erosion potential.  Small grains have lower erosion potential 
because of the soil cover they provide.  But corn, soybeans, vegetable, and tobacco are 
also grown on more productive soils, indicating both greater returns from conservation 
investment and greater short run productivity losses from (and thus opportunity costs of) 
conservation investment.  Thus, the coefficients of these crop acreage variables could be 
either positive or negative. 
We use two regression models to explore the relationship between soil 
conservation investment, tenure, size of operation, land characteristics, and cropping 
patterns.  The first is a simple linear regression.  Since the dependent variable consists of 
count data (the number of conservation measures used is a non-negative integer), a 
Poisson regression model was also estimated.  Both models were estimated using 
LIMDEP.  Descriptive statistics of the data used in the regressions are given in Table 1.  
The estimated parameters are given in Table 2. 
As hypothesized, the coefficient of the share of land rented is positive and 
significantly different from zero in both models.  Thus, the regression results are 
consistent with the hypothesis generated by the theoretical model, namely that in rental 
land market equilibrium landlords will tend to invest in contractible soil conservation 
measures as a means of mitigating renters’ non-contractible overexploitation of soil. 
The coefficient of total acres operated is also positive and significantly different 
from zero in both models, indicating that a greater number of soil conservation measures 
are used on larger operations.  This result is consistent with the notion that, in Maryland 
at least, larger operations tend to be more heterogeneous, so that it tends to be profitable 
to invest in a greater variety of soil conservation measures.   15
The coefficient of corn acreage is negative and significantly different from zero in 
both models.  This result is consistent with the notion that the opportunity cost of these 
soil conservation measures (in terms of current productivity losses) is greater on land 
suited for corn production. 
The coefficient of tobacco acreage is positive in both models, significantly 
different from zero at a 1 percent significance level in the Poisson regression, and 
significantly different from zero at a 10 percent significance level in the linear regression 
model.  This result is consistent with the notion that gains from erosion control are 
greater on land used for tobacco.  Limits on tobacco marketing due to government quotas 
also tends to limit the opportunity cost of soil conservation investments in terms of 
current productivity losses. 
Conclusion 
The relationship between tenancy and soil conservation has remained something of a 
puzzle.  Theory clearly indicates that renters have less incentive than landlords to make 
investments that preserve soil.  Yet the empirical literature, taken as a whole, has failed to 
establish an unambiguous impact of tenancy on soil conservation investment, let alone a 
negative correlation.  One possible explanation is the literature to date has been one-
sided, considering only renters’ and landlords’ incentives separately and ignoring 
renter/landlord interactions in markets for rental land. 
This paper examines soil conservation investment in rental land market 
equilibrium.  We focus on the role of soil conservation structures or other measures that 
are easily observable and costly to alter.  Landlords can either install in these measures 
themselves or stipulate them as enforceable provisions in land rental contracts.    16
Investment in such measures gives landlords a means of mitigating renters’ tendency to 
overexploit soil.  We show theoretically that, when soil loss in non-contractible but such 
investments are feasible, landlords’ investment in these measures in rental land market 
equilibrium will generally exceed first best levels.  Soil loss, however, may be greater 
than the first best level even in the presence of such investments.  An empirical study of 
Maryland farmers’ use of these kinds of soil conservation measures confirms this 
hypothesis of a positive correlation between tenancy and soil conservation investment: 
Farmers operating larger shares of rental land use a greater number of these soil 
conservation measures. 
The results of this analysis demonstrate the importance of taking into account the 
specific nature of soil conservation investments and the relationship between landlords 
and renters.  Studies by Allen and Lueck and by Soule, Tegene, and Wiebe show that 
different forms of tenancy affect renters’ soil conservation incentives.  The results of this 
study show that landlord’s ability to enforce provisions of rental contracts also influence 
renter’s soil conservation.  Certain kinds of soil conservation measures give landlords an 
ability to limit renters’ overexploitation of soils.  Investment in these measures in rental 
land market equilibrium differs markedly from investment in measures that are non-
contractible.   17
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of the 1998 Maryland Survey Data 
Variable  Mean  Standard Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
Number of Practices  1.918668 2.27093622 0  11
Share of Land Rented  0.134807 0.276404678 0  1
Percentage of Land with Moderate 
Slope  29.4774 34.0264043 0  100
Percentage of Land with High Slope  7.142756 15.9239967 0  100
Total Land Operated  186.188 267.815721 0  7100
Corn Acres  32.3996 95.0977194 0  2000
Soybean Acres  33.70176 108.06585 0  2000
Small Grains Acres  19.55664 61.8553595 0  1200
Vegetables Acres  1.750397 21.2753119 0  900
Tobacco Acres  0.349083 2.38280894 0  80
   19
Table 2. Estimated Coefficients of Linear and Poisson Regression Models of 
Conservation Investment 
Linear Regression  Poisson Regression 
Variable  Coefficient  Standard Error  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Constant  1.5086283**  0.18540346  0.560068**  5.50E-02 
Share of Land Rented  0.9328389*  0.43551481  0.382164**  0.10999998 
Percentage of Land with Moderate 
Slope  1.30E-02**  3.34E-03  4.95E-03**  8.98E-04 
Percentage of Land with High Slope  5.88E-03  7.39E-03  2.69E-03  1.89E-03 
Total Land Operated  4.18E-03**  9.49E-04  1.14E-03**  2.16E-04 
Corn Acres  -6.23E-03**  2.34E-03  -1.97E-03**  6.15E-04 
Soybean Acres  -2.42E-03  1.94E-03  -6.42E-04  5.22E-04 
Small Grains Acres  -1.12E-03  2.85E-03  -5.18E-04  7.37E-04 
Vegetables Acres  -2.44E-03  5.26E-03  -3.74E-04  1.38E-03 
Tobacco Acres  8.26E-02  4.59E-02  2.01E-02*  8.13E-03 
** denotes significantly different from zero at a 1% level. 
* denotes significantly different from zero at a 5% level. 
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Figure 1. Comparison of First Best and Rental Land Market Equilibrium Soil Loss (s) 
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